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Foreword 
 
A number of issues continue to underpin the international political economy of 
hydrocarbons. Stalled Paris Agreement, growing role of energy diplomacy, and the 
rise of protectionism to name a few all add to uncertainty affecting long-term 
calculus of the industry players and policy makers alike. The innovation continues in 
particular in the battery storage development holding promise for a more down-top, 
‘democratised’ energy policy for the future and a greater say for consumers and 
communities. Yet, while we are still waiting for the full benefits of the innovative 
solutions to come to fruition (and possibly interrupt the energy systems as we know 
them) the ‘knowns’, geopolitical constraints are still on the agenda.  
 
Hence, having in mind the stated objective of this Working Paper Series we welcome 
four authors who cover three highly topical matters from a policy and academic 
perspectives. 
 
European Commission’s new regulatory proposal is the most recent development ‘on 
the radar’. Danila Bochkarev policy paper calls for caution in ‘cracking’ Europe’s 
‘energy software’ – the Existing European regulatory framework – due to the effects 
it may have on the EU’s energy market and the ‘hardware’ (the energy infrastructure, 
including interconnectors).  
 
Further on, John Roberts takes on board the intertwined politics of Southern Gas 
Corridor and Turkish Stream projects. The prime focus of his contribution is the 
long-term development of the Corridor and the role of the Turkish Stream 
(TurkStream) pipeline in determining the outcome of such a development. 
 
Finally, the paper by Eamonn Butler and Wojciech Ostrowski provide for a critical 
perspective on the Central and Eastern European (CEE) energy relations. Butler and 
Ostrowski argue that the economic and political complexities of individual CEE 
countries remain largely understudied in wider literature and they propose a step 
beyond a well-established narrative developed around the region’s division into anti-
Russian, pro-Russian and neutral bases.   
 
I hope the contents of the fourth volume of our Working Paper Series will be 
considered useful by our readers. The responsibility of views and opinions expressed 
in the papers remains with their authors. 
 
Dr Slawomir Raszewski  
Editor of EUCERS ‘Reflections’ Working Paper Series 
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Let’s be cautious about trying 
to “crack” Europe’s ‘energy 
software’: The new European 




We are currently observing a real proliferation of energy regulation and framework 
strategies (Energy Union, new Gas Directive, etc.) in the EU. This is creating new 
complex “rules of the energy game” improving Europe’s energy security and 
defending consumers’ interests. New regulations run the risk of overregulating 
markets and increasing the bureaucratic control over the energy market. Does 
Europe really need these changes? From the natural gas market perspective, Europe 
is already close to achieving these goals even with the current market design. 
Existing European regulatory framework (‘software’) and energy infrastructure, 
including interconnectors (‘hardware’) have already proven themselves to be highly 
effective means of reinforcing security of energy supplies by providing European 
customers with diverse, affordable, sustainable and reliable energy. If it is a race for 
competencies and power, one should remember that an attempt to ‘crack’ energy 
‘software’ may result in systemic failures. Furthermore, in case such changes are 
considered necessary and unavoidable, they should not be made without proper 
consultation with all stakeholders. The European Commission confirmed itself that 
implementation of proposals “starts with a good impact assessment and stakeholder 
consultation”.  




We are currently observing a real 
proliferation of energy regulation on 
the EU level extending the Union’s 
competence into areas which to a 
larger degree are subject to the level of 
proficiency in Member States. With 
this reach for additional power and 
responsibility the European 
Commission tries to create a new and 
complex “rules of the energy game”, 
while creating additional uncertainties 
for investors. The European 
Commission has been particularly 
active in proposing new regulations 
and framework strategies such as 
revision of the Security of Supply 
regulation, Intergovernmental 
Agreements (IGAs), the proposal for 
amending the Gas Directive 
2009/73/EC, the Clean Energy 
Package and the Energy Union.  
This shift of responsibilities from the 
national governments to Brussels has 
therefore reached a new quality. An 
industry commentator rightfully noted 
that “EU energy and climate policy 
has turned into a process exclusively 
for specialist policymakers, NGO’s 
and lobbyists.”  Furthermore, new 
regulations “run the risk 
of overregulating markets”, increasing 
the bureaucratic burden for the 
national regulators and competent 
authorities under the pretext to 
“promote ‘energy governance’, i.e. 
more EU control over the energy 
market”1  
                                                 
 
1 Karel Beckman, ‘For a kinder, simpler Energy 
Union’, Energy Post Weekly, 19 December 
New Regulatory Proposals: 
Hidden Rationale? 
  
What is the real rationale for the 
Energy Union? What is the Energy 
Union and why is it so important for 
the European Commission? On 25 
February 2015, the European 
Commission put forward a proposal 
for an Energy Union in a document 
entitled ‘A Framework Strategy for a 
Resilient Energy Union with a 
Forward-Looking Climate Change 
Policy.’ This ‘umbrella strategy’ was 
initially aimed at ensuring Europe’s 
smooth transition to a low-
carbon/decarbonised future. The plan 
was to certify that European citizens 
would have unrestricted access to 
secure, affordable/competitive and 
climate-friendly energy sources. The 
Energy Union is – at least officially – 
standing on the three key pillars: 
secure and reliable energy supplies, 
competitive sources of energy and 
affordability/sustainability of Europe’s 
energy supplies.2 
Donald Tusk Former Polish Prime 
Minister and current President of the 
European Council was one of the 
founding-fathers of the Energy Union. 
In his opinion piece ‘A united Europe 
can end Russia’s energy stranglehold’ 
published by Financial Times on 21 
April 2014, Tusk proposed an energy 
union in order to reduce Europe’s 








EUCERS ‘Reflections’ Working Paper Series, Vol 4, Winter/Spring 2018 8 
“excessive dependence on Russian 
energy”. Tusk’s initiative was based on 
the key principles – “a mechanism for 
jointly negotiating energy contracts 
with Russia”, solidarity between 
Member States, construction of an 
adequate energy infrastructure, full 
use of (domestic) fossil fuels (such as 
shale gas and coal) and establishing 
contacts with alternative natural gas 
suppliers namely Australia and the 
United States. Tusk also proposed a 
“European body charged with buying 
its (Russian) gas”.3 Despite some 
commonalities, the current “version” 
of the Energy Union stands quite far 
from Tusk’s proposal – unconventional 
gas and coal are not the key pillars of 
this framework strategy and collective 
gas is barely mentioned in Brussels. 
These trends went against the 
expectations of some Central and 
Eastern European states. This was a 
source of many political 
misconceptions, deceptions and 
frustrations.  
Here we come to one of the Europe’s 
most important energy question: does 
anyone really know what the end goal 
of the Energy Union is? Is the EU 
trying to achieve a single unimpeded 
internal energy market run solely by 
EU institutions (regulators, 
transmission system operators, 
politicians)?4 Unofficially, the Energy 
Union – as a pan-European umbrella 
strategy – also might be considered as 




4 The issue was raised by Karel Beckman in his 
article ‘For a kinder, simpler Energy Union’ 
https://energypostweekly.eu/december-19-
2017-watch/  
an important tool in a bureaucratic 
struggle between Brussels and the 
national capitals for influence on the 
energy regulation processes in Europe. 
In fact, there is nothing new and every 
bureaucratic institution “wants to grab 
ever more competencies”.5 
Currently, many important aspects of 
the national energy policies –such as 
the choice of the energy mix – still 
belong to the Member States. Article 
194 of the Lisbon treaty state that the 
“European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, shall 
establish the measures necessary to 
achieve the objectives in paragraph 1.”  
These include the functioning of the 
energy market and security of energy 
supply in the Union through the 
promotion of interconnectors, energy 
efficiency and renewable energy. 
However, “such measures shall not 
affect a Member State's right to 
determine the conditions for exploiting 
its energy resources, its choice between 
different energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy 
supply”.6  
In this context, the importance of 
Commission’s attempt to obtain a 
                                                 
 
5 Walter Boltz, former deputy chairman of the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER) quoted in Kalina 
Oroschakoff, ‘Tusk’s rude awakening’, Politico, 
20 April 2015 
https://www.politico.eu/article/tusk-energy-
union-hits-eu-reality/  
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mandate from the Council to negotiate 
an agreement with Russia on Nord 
Stream-2 and to amend the Gas 
Directive goes beyond this pipeline 
project and will have implications on 
the future direction of the European 
energy policy. However, this is also 
counter to the Member States’ right to 
determine the conditions of the 
general structure of its energy supply.  
On 9 June 2017, the European 
Commission adopted a request from 
the Council of the European Union for 
a mandate to negotiate with Russia the 
key principles for the operation of the 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Commenting 
on this initiative, the Vice-President 
for the Energy Union 
Maroš Šefčovič said: “Nord Stream 2 
does not contribute to the Energy 
Union's objectives. If the pipeline is 
nevertheless built, the least we have to 
do is to make sure that it will be 
operated in a transparent manner 
and in line with the main EU energy 
market rules.” The Commission 
argued that Nord Stream 2 should be 
governed by “a special legal 
framework, which would take into 
account fundamental principles (third 
party access, unbundling, etc.) 
stemming from international and EU 
energy law” thus de facto applying the 
3rd Package to this project. 
Commissioner for Climate Action and 
Energy Miguel Arias Cañete added that 
“Nord Stream 2 cannot and should 
not operate in a legal void or 
according to a third country's energy 
laws only"7 




A little note is necessary to understand 
the importance of Nord Stream 2 in 
the context of the Energy Union. 
Energy relations between Brussels and 
Moscow have deteriorated following an 
investigation into Gazprom’s suspected 
violations of EU antitrust rules and the 
crisis in Ukraine. Energy rhetoric has 
deteriorated, whereby the South 
Stream gas pipeline was one of the 
casualties of the new political reality in 
Europe. When the Nord Stream 2 
project was launched in September 
2015 few months after the ‘birth’ of the 
Energy Union, the gas pipeline was 
immediately seen by the project’s 
opponents as incompatible with the 
Energy Union’s goals. In this context, 
the Energy Union was presented as a 
tool to asses various energy 
infrastructure projects. One should 
however remember that this ‘umbrella 
strategy’ is not a compliance checklist, 
especially taking into account the fact 
that it is not - unlike the 3rd Energy 
Package - a legally binding document 
and as such is not yet a part of the 
acquis communautaire.  
However, the Commission failed to 
achieve the necessary backing from the 
Member States and the opinion Legal 
Service of the Council of the European 
Union released on 27 September 2017 
saw no “legal void” in relation to Nord 
Stream 2 and confirmed that Gas 
Directive 2009/73 do not apply to the 
pipeline.8    
                                                 
 
8 Opinion of the Legal Service of the Council: 
Opinion of the Legal Service was published by 
Politico on 28 Septemeber 2017 
http://www.politico.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/SPOLITICO-
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The European Commission however 
did not leave its attempts to assert its 
powers over the project and the 
European regulatory process. When 
the mandate process was stalled, the 
European Commission decided to 
amend the Gas Directive to extend it 
beyond the territory of the EU. Thus, 
extending the Union’s competence into 
areas, which to a larger degree, lie 
outside the sovereign territory of 
Member States.  
On 8 November 2017 the European 
Commission took “steps to amend 
common EU gas rules to import 
pipelines”. It launched an amendment 
of the Gas Directive in order to apply 
the Third Energy Package’s rules to all 
import pipelines supplying natural gas 
to the European Union from countries 
outside the EU’s internal market.9  
Currently the EU’s energy laws for the 
internal market do not apply to any 
such import pipelines– a fact currently 
recognised by the Commission itself. 
                                                                      
 
17092812480.pdf More comprehensively the 
issue of mandate and the application of EU 
energy law to Nord Stream 2 was addressed by 
Kim Talus and Katya Yafimava. For example, 
see Talus, K., ‘Application of EU energy and 
certain national laws of Baltic sea countries to 
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project’, Journal of 
World Energy Law and Business, March 2017; 
Katya Yafimova, “The Council Legal Service’s 
assessment of the European Commission’s 
negotiating mandate and what it means for 
Nord Stream 2”, Oxford Institute for Energy 








New amendments would require the 
owners of offshore gas infrastructure 
to achieve effective unbundling and 
allow third-party access. An official 
explanation for the proposal to amend 
the EU Gas Directive is an 
improvement of the “functioning of the 
EU internal energy market and 
enhances solidarity between Member 
States”10. Earlier on 13 September 2017 
in the context of his State of the 
European Union Speech, 
President Juncker announced that, 
“building upon the solidarity aspect of 
the Energy Union, the Commission 
will propose common rules for gas 
pipelines entering the European 
internal gas market”.11 
 
The European Commission, 
Directorate for Energy argues the 
Article. 194 TFEU serves as the legal 
basis for the proposed changes to the 
Gas Directive.12 These envisioned 
changes would ensure the functioning 
of the internal energy market and 
security of supply. What the European 
Commission and DG ENER however 
fail to demonstrate is why the internal 
energy market and security of supply 
can’t be archived if the envisioned 
changes are not made. No further 
                                                 
 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL amending Directive 2009/73/EC 
concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas,  COM/2017/0660 final - 
2017/0294 (COD), point 2 “LEGAL BASIS, 
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explanations are given, and it remains 
unclear if the envisaged changes are 
suitable or necessary to archive the 
goals of the Energy Unions cited in 
Article. 194 TFEU.  
The European Commission argues that 
the lack of EU-wide rules for import 
pipelines from third countries has a 
negative impact on the goals of the 
Energy Union as the EU obtains most 
of the gas it consumes from third 
countries. DG ENER argues that by 
changing the rules, inter alia, the 
operation of these import pipelines 
would therefore contribute 
significantly to the functioning of the 
internal energy market and security of 
supply. However, contradicting its own 
argument of the needed changes 
deemed particularly relevant for the 
internal energy market and security of 
supply, as the respective proposal 
suggests, that Member States can 
exempt these pipelines from the 
regulation.  This also implies that the 
proposed changes do not overcome the 
existing lack of regulation which is 
deemed an impairment to the internal 
energy market and security of supply 
for the Energy Union.  
The European Commission admits that 
this intended regulation would result 
in a “conflict of law”, at least with the 
law of the third country whose 
companies operate the offshore 
pipelines. This self-generated “conflict 
of law” should however be solved by 
another directive that has just been 
recently amended: the decision on 
intergovernmental energy agreements 
with third countries (IGAs).  
Thus, by extending the applicability of 
the Gas Directive via the proposed 
amendment, the European 
Commission – and DG ENER in 
particular – are not only trying to 
create additional internal EU 
competences, but are also attempting 
to create the preconditions for an 
exclusive external Union competently 
in line with Article. 3(2) TFEU for this 
area. The draft amendment to the Gas 
Directive aims to shift what so far has 
been a Member State competence in 
the field of international agreements, 
e.g. regarding the operation of offshore 
pipelines from third countries, to 
becoming what will likely be an 
exclusive European Union 
competence. Severin Fischer, a Senior 
Researcher at the Center for Security 
Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich suggested 
that the EC “constructed the problem 
of a “legal void”, claiming that a 
conflict of laws on energy regulation 
were apparent in the Baltic Sea, 
knowing full well that EU energy 
market regulation has never been used 
for comparable import pipelines 
before, not to mention an application 
in the offshore Exclusive Economic 
Zones. To solve this artificially 
constructed problem, the Commission 
asked the Council for a mandate to 
start negotiations on an 
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) 
with Russia. This IGA should include 
all important elements of the EU’s 
domestic approach, namely: third 
party access to the pipeline, 
unbundling of ownership and 
operation of the pipeline, tariff 
regulation and transparency”13 One 
                                                 
 
13 Severin Fischer, ‘Lost in regulation: the EU 
and Nord Stream 2’, Energy Post, 13 
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should ask if this shift is purely 
politically motivated as it is unclear 
how does it contribute to legal 
certainty or legal harmonization in the 
European Union.  
 
EU markets are already 
providing security of supply and 
competitive pricing  
 
Does Europe really need these 
changes? From the natural gas market 
perspective Europe is already close to 
achieving these goals even with the 
current market design. Existing 
European regulatory framework 
(‘software’) and energy infrastructure 
(‘hardware’) has already proved itself 
to be a highly effective means of 
reinforcing security of energy supplies 
and providing European customers 
with diverse, affordable, sustainable 
and reliable energy supplies.  
Natural gas prices are finally 
affordable for the European 
consumers. The European Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER) noted that the European gas 
wholesale market “continued to 
progress and market dynamics seem to 
work better and better with gas prices 
registering a “constant decline … which 
is the result of market fundamentals 
and increased gas-to-gas 
competition”.14 Overall the European 




14 ACER Market Monitoring Report 2015 – 
GAS, p. 6 
https://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_docume
energy import bill has decreased by 
almost 50% in the last 4-5 years. 
Energy products represented 25% of 
total EU imports in 2013 and only 15% 
in the first half of 2017.15 Global energy 
played a substantial role in bringing 
prices down, but EU market 
mechanisms and increased level of 
interconnectivity also played a role 
which should not be neglected.  
 
Figure: extra-EU imports of energy products, 
monthly averages, 2010-16. (C)Eurostat, 2017. 
 
One can argue that gas prices depend 
on many factors but infrastructure 
seems to be one of the most important 
variables in this price equation. The 
consensus implies that any additional 
infrastructure guarantees flexibility of 
supply and has a positive impact on 
consumers. The increased level of 
interconnectivity and new reverse flow 
options that have been created over the 
last few years, allow the EU countries 
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to source gas from neighbouring 
countries often situated outside 
traditional east-west energy supply 
corridors. 
The total Central and East European 
(CEE) east-west reverse flow capacity 
currently stands at about 147 
bcm/year, while a further 42 bcm/year 
of new interconnection capacity has 
been added within Eastern Europe and 
between Central and Western Europe 
over the last five years. Poland can now 
obtain over 90 % of its gas imports 
from non-Russian sources.16 This 
connectivity has helped to reduce the 
price divergence between the West and 
the East. For example, in the first half 
of 2014, the gap between the average 
wholesale price between the Dutch 
trading hub TTF (21.58 euro/MWh), 
the most liquid hub on the European 
Continent, and the Czech Republic 
(27.81 euro/MWh) was still quite 
significant – over 6 euro/MWh. In the 
third quarter of 2017 wholesale prices 
at the TTF (16.14 euro/MWh) and the 
Czech Republic (16.16 euro/MWh) 
converged.17 In 2016, Poland’s 
wholesale gas prices fell by 31% 
compared to 2014, to 15.4 euro/MWh 
– compared to an EU average of 15.0 
euro MWh, while Polish household gas 
                                                 
 
16 For more details please see 
http://energypost.eu/quiet-revolution-central-
eastern-european-gas-market/  
17 For more details on prices please see 
European Commission Quarterly Report on 





prices fell by 13.4% from 2013 to 2016, 
faster than the EU average (10.0%)18 
 This connectivity also helped to 
spread the sense of confidence that 
exists in the mature markets in 
Western Europe to the new Member 
States. Gas is therefore becoming an 
‘ordinary’ source of energy which can 
be sourced almost everywhere, and its 
source of origin could no longer a 
matter of concern for energy importing 
countries. The feeling of confidence is 
also being increasingly shared by the 
EU decision makers. In an interview 
with Interfax Natural Gas 
Daily published on May 2, 2017 Vaclav 
Bartuska, Czech ambassador-at-large 
for energy security said: “we don’t get 
this anti-Russian rhetoric, as the whole 
logic of the common EU market is that 
when Russian gas crosses EU border, 
it’s no longer Russian, nor Norwegian 
nor Algerian. It’s simply gas that is 
measured by its economic value. We 
find it a safe resource”.19    
Security of the supply is therefore 
made great advances. EU Energy 
Market has also proven itself as the 
best system to deliver security of 
supply. The majority of existing 
insecurities arise from an incomplete 
implementation of EU rules and lack of 
efforts in addressing bottlenecks and 
infrastructure deficiencies. In its’ 
                                                 
 
18 For more details please see EC’s Energy 
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response to the Commission 
consultation on an EU Strategy for 
liquefied natural gas and gas storage, 
Shell noted that “security of supply 
issues in some European countries are 
created or exacerbated by the very slow 
adoption of the European Regulatory 
framework”. A well-functioning 
market is the “best way to deliver 
security of supply,” – concluded 
Shell.20 Even the European 
Commission also confirmed this point 
of view and stressing the progress 
achieved in providing the EU Member 
States with the security of energy 
supplies. During the State of Union 
debate at the European Parliament on 
1 February 2017 Vice President of the 
Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič 
confirmed that energy security has 
significantly improved in a vast 
majority of the EU Member States. For 
instance, Mr. Šefčovič confirmed that 
“22 out of 28 countries are actually 
better off (in terms of energy security – 
note of the author); having better 
infrastructure and interconnectors 
with reverse flows is giving us much 
more confidence; the European market 
is much more liquid than it ever was 
before”21  
Last but not least: increased 
consumption of natural gas in Europe 
helps achieving decarbonisation goals. 












In this context, the United Kingdom 
shows Europe leads on how the use of 
gas could reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions without imposing 
excessive financial burden on industry 
and population.  
EU market dynamics also forced non-
European suppliers to change their 
market behavior. The non-EU 
companies realised they are running 
the risk to rapidly losing their market 
share if they can’t effectively adapt to 
the new market realities. For example, 
Gazprom accused by the European 
Commission of breaking EU antitrust 
rules, accepted to amend its’ market 
strategy and submitted relevant 
commitments to the Commission.  DG 
COMP positively assessed these 
commitments. "We believe that 
Gazprom's commitments will enable 
the free flow of gas in Central and 
Eastern Europe at competitive prices. 
They address our competition 
concerns and provide a forward-
looking solution in line with EU rules. 
In fact, they help to better integrate gas 
markets in the region,” - said 
Margrethe Vestager, EU Commissioner 
for Competition.22 It is somehow 
surprising to observe the third-country 
companies willingly playing by the 
rules established by the Commission, 
while the EC itself is trying to apply 
regulatory flexibility, changing 
regulations according political 
considerations.  
EU regulations and a single market are 
sufficient to regulate supplies from the 
third countries and address all relevant 
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consumers’ concerns. It is therefore 
essential to understand how do these 
regulations improve the consumer’s 
energy security, choice of supplies and 
maximise economic benefit for the EU 
citizens? Do these changes take 
account of the customer’s point of view 
or this is a part of a political game 
inside the ‘Brussels bubble’?   
 
Attempt to achieve a regulatory 
flexibility? 
Is the Commission trying to achieve 
regulatory flexibility? In this case, 
these rules a la carte could create a 
precedent for politicisation of the 
energy sector and this attitude might 
have damaging effects. Severin Fischer 
of the Centre for Security Studies 
(CSS), ETH Zurich, has rightfully said 
that “Over-politicisation of natural gas 
as security problem leads to non-
market behaviour… higher prices and 
increases investment costs.”23 Higher 
energy prices do not only mean higher 
energy bills. Increases in energy and in 
particular natural gas prices will be an 
imminent threat to hundreds of 
thousands jobs in Europe and the 
social welfare of its citizens.  Chemical 
industries, just as an example, are 
particularly sensitive to the energy 
prices. According to the European 
Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) 
data this sector alone employs over 1.2 
million people in Europe and around 
3.6 million if you include related 
service jobs in the EU Member States.  






Amendments to the Gas Directive, if 
they affect gas transport from third 
countries to the EU, would effectively 
be a qualitative expansion of the EU 
internal market law – certainly not a 
small technicality which might also 
have consequences for the Southern 
Gas Corridor and Europe’s relations 
with the key energy exporters in its’ 
neighbourhood. Europe’s partners 
might also have to ask themselves 
whether the EU rules – generally seen 
as an example to follow – can be 
trusted if they are so easily changed 
according to rapidly evolving political 
calculations? If the EC starts to 
interpret its own rules politically, who 
will prevent the third countries or even 
EU member states from doing the 
same? Regulatory flexibility may create 
conflict with already existing norms of 
international law where Brussels might 
not be always the winner. For example, 
Russia has challenged the Third 
Energy Package and the TEN-E 
regulation in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).24 While the WTO 
panel report endorses the EU’s 
arguments, to the “astonishment of the 
European Commission, it also 
characterises the Projects of Common 
Interests as discriminatory and 
directed against third country 
projects”25  





25 Presentation by Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, 
Director, European Commission, European 
Parliament's Committee on Industry, Research 
and Energy (11 October 2017); subject: 
“Negotiation mandate for Nord Stream 2: state 
of play” (unofficial transcript); Dods EU 
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Conclusion 
The EU energy market is already 
bringing benefits and one should be 
cautious about trying to “crack” 
Europe’s ‘energy software’. All PC 
users know that unnecessary software 
changes slow down computers. 
Similarly to IT equipment EU energy 
markets may stop running smoothly if 
the regulatory environment becomes 
excessively complex. ACER rightfully 
notes that the “current regulatory 
model should be allowed time fully to 
deliver its positive results. Regulatory 
stability should be encouraged.”26  
Furthermore, the regulatory process is 
too important and proposed changes 
should not be discussed without 
proper consultations with all 
stakeholders. The European 
Commission in its improved regulation 
guidelines confirmed that 
implementation of proposals “starts 







                                                                      
 
provides a full transcription of the ITRE 











About the author 
 
Danila Bochkarev specialises in 
Eurasia energy and natural resources 
issues with a particular focus on the 
natural gas. Before joining the 
EastWest Institute, Danila was an 
Inbev visiting scholar for EU-Russia 
relations at the at UCL/KUL 
universities in Belgium. He also 
worked on China and Central Asia 
affairs at the European Parliament and 
the Energy Charter Secretariat and 














The Relationship between the 
Southern Gas Corridor and 
Turkish Stream 






As of December 2017, the main Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) elements are generally 
close to completion, so that the physical infrastructure should be in place for gas 
from Azerbaijan’s giant Shah Deniz field to reach Turkey in the second half of 2018 
and destinations in the European Union from the start of 2020.  
But while upstream field development and the laying of physical pipe proceeds apace 
from Azerbaijan all the way to Albania, there are three issues that have the potential 
to cause serious repercussions for the SGC, thus affecting the SGC’s long term impact 
on European gas supplies and European energy security. Two concern the physical 
development or operation of the pipeline. The third concerns its long-term 
development, and it is this issue – and the role of TurkStream in determining the 
outcome of such development – which is the prime focus of this paper.  
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Introduction 
The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) is 
the collective term for more than 
US$40bn worth of projects which will 
initially bring Azerbaijani gas to 
Europe and which are eventually 
intended to carry gas from other 
Caspian and Middle Eastern suppliers 
as well. 
As of December 2017, the main SGC 
elements are generally close to 
completion, so that the physical 
infrastructure should be in place for 
gas from Azerbaijan’s giant Shah Deniz 
field to reach Turkey in the second half 
of 2018 and destinations in the 
European Union from the start of 
2020.  
But while upstream field development 
and the laying of physical pipe 
proceeds apace from Azerbaijan all the 
way to Albania, there are three issues 
that have the potential to cause serious 
repercussions for the SGC, thus 
affecting the SGC’s long term impact 
on European gas supplies and 
European energy security. Two 
concern the physical development or 
operation of the pipeline. The third 
concerns its long-term development, 
and it is this issue – and the role of 
TurkStream in determining the 
outcome of such development – which 
is the prime focus of this paper.  
The first issue concerns the landfall in 
Italy of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline 
(TAP) and whether local politics might 
yet cause delays in developing the final 
leg of the SGC’s 3,500-km pipeline 
system, the eight-km section from the 
Italian coast to a new connection with 
the country’s existing gasline network, 
thus delaying – or in a worst case 
scenario, aborting – the delivery of 
some 9 bcm of gas to Italy. 
The second issue concerns the overall 
security situation within Turkey and 
the possibility that increasing political 
tensions might lead to prolonged 
instability threatening both foreign 
and domestic investments, including 
oil and gas pipelines. 
It is worth emphasising that those 
involved in ensuring a successful SGC 
landfall in Italy, namely the developers 
of TAP, continue to stress that they 
expect to complete their work in time 
to enable the first gas to reach Italy via 
the SGC in early 2020, and that, while 
there is indeed continued local 
political opposition in Italy’s Puglia 
region to the project, at present it looks 
as if the worst that can happen is that 
the start of key construction works is 
delayed, possibly prompting a 
subsequent delay to first deliveries. 
It is also important to stress that the 
danger posed by potential internal 
instability in Turkey is not necessarily 
a threat directed particularly at the 
SGC, but relates to the increasing 
polarisation of political and social 
attitudes. In particular, it relates to the 
increasing alienation of the country’s 
Kurdish community at a time when the 
Turkish Government is not only 
engaged in open warfare with PKK 
fighters in south-eastern Turkey but is 
imprisoning some important Kurdish 
members of parliament and is also 
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conducting a widespread purge – 
including civil servants, teachers and 
military personnel – in response to a 
failed coup in July 2016. So far, there 
is little sign that the Kurdish-related 
violence in the southeast is extending 
to the rest of the country, but bombing 
attacks in major cities attributed to 
Islamist militants and the ferocity of 
the government’s post-coup 
crackdown have prompted serious 
concerns in the western business 
community about the country’s 
internal security situation.  
The challenges posed by both these 
issues are beyond the scope of this 
paper. They are noted simply to make 
the point that the challenge posed by 
Russia’s TurkStream project is not the 
only issue capable of impacting 
dramatically on the future of the SGC. 
Moreover, while all these issues 
possess the capability of damaging the 
development or operation of the SGC, 
what really counts is the likelihood 
that they will occur. At this stage, 
suffice it to say that it is quite likely 
that TurkStream (as the Russians now 
officially call Turkish Stream) will 
indeed significantly impact on second 
stage development of the SGC, hence 
this paper. But the possibility that the 
TAP might not be able to make landfall 
in Italy – a concern that in early 2017 
prompted at least some contingency 
planning from TAP partners – is 
negligible. As for averting any delay 
due to regional political objections, a 
recent change in TAP management, 
which has seen a greater role for 
personnel from Italy’s SNAM gas 
group, should help to overcome these, 
since SNAM is not only a 20 percent 
stakeholder in TAP but because the 
final point on the TAP line will be its 
connection to the SNAM-operated 
Italian distribution system.  
 
The TurkStream Challenge 
The SGC has to be considered in two 
ways, as a set of projects that require a 
commercial rationale and as an 
element in the European Union’s drive 
to diversify sources of supply and thus 
reduce its vulnerability regarding 
supplies from Russia, though not 
necessarily to reduce actual import 
volumes from Russia. The SGC 
projects are intended, in their first 
stage, to deliver 6 bcm/y of Azerbaijani 
gas to Turkey and a further 10m bcm/y 
to European customers beyond 
Turkey. Deliveries to Turkey are 
expected to start in the second half of 
2018 and to customers beyond Turkey. 
The second stage would see the 
installation of additional compression 
to enable these volumes to be doubled. 
For its part Gazprom envisages 
TurkStream as a system that will 
consist of two sets of 15.75 bcm/y 
capacity pipes – called “strings”. The 
first 15.75 bcm/y capacity string would 
be essentially dedicated to providing a 
replacement route for gas deliveries to 
Turkey once Russia discontinues 
transit (or it least much of its transit) 
across Ukraine at the end of 2019 and, 
in effect, ceases to use the Trans-
Balkan Pipeline through Moldova, 
Romania and Bulgaria for routine 
deliveries of some 12-14 bcm/y to 
Turkish customers. The second 15.75 
bcm/y capacity string would be used to 
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deliver gas to European customers 
beyond Turkey.  
The SGC projects include upstream 
field development in Azerbaijan, 
onshore pipeline construction across 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Greece 
and Albania, and a subsea connection 
from Albania to Italy. First stage 
development is collectively expected to 
cost around €40bn, while second stage 
development will cost much less, since 
other producers would be responsible 
for upstream development, the 
physical pipe has already been laid, 
and so, essentially, all that is required 
is extra compression to push the gas 
through the existing pipes. With 
regard to the first stage, the 
overwhelming bulk of the work to be 
carried out in developing the upstream 
and shipping the gas to and through 
Turkey has already been completed, 
and though work on the final section, 
the TAP, is only half-completed, it is 
only due to start operation more than a 
year after the earlier sections to 
Turkey.  
So long as the TAP line is completed 
successfully, then, according to the 
consortia of companies developing this 
integrated system, there is little reason 
to doubt the commerciality of the 
venture. Azerbaijan’s SGC company, 
which represents Azerbaijan’s interests 
in the various SGC projects, in August 
2017 described the SGC in a statement 
to the local Trend news agency as a 
‘chain of interlinked projects 
comprising one value chain’ and that 
its commerciality was based upon the 
delivery of the initial contracted 
deliveries of 6bcm/y to Turkey and 10 
bcm/y beyond Turkey.  
‘The profitability and economy of all 
Southern Gas Corridor projects were 
based on these volumes of gas, thus are 
independent from gas supply from 
third parties’, Trend quoted the 
statement as saying.  
The challenge posed by TurkStream 
concerns second stage development of 
the SGC: the planned doubling of the 
system’s capacity so that as much as 32 
bcm/y would be able to reach Turkey, 
with 20 bcm/y of this available for 
delivery beyond Turkey, notably to 
Italy. Apart from one section in 
Georgia, this would not require the 
laying of any fresh pipe but would rely 
on the addition of extra compressor 
plant. This challenge potentially takes 
two forms. The first is outright 
competition through the laying of a 
completely new pipe across 
Southeastern Europe to reach either 
the Italian market or a major 
European hub such as Baumgarten in 
Austria. The second is by seeking to 
utilize the projected second stage 
expansion capacity of the TAP to 
ensure the delivery of Russian gas to 
customers in Italy or served through 
Italy.  
No less a person than Russian Prime 
Minister Dmitry Medvedev 
demonstrated that Russia is at least 
paying nominal attention to the first 
option when, while discussing 
TurkStream in Istanbul, he stated on 
23 May 2017 that: 
‘Altogether, two lines of the gas 
pipeline are expected to be laid. 
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One of them will be completely 
oriented toward the Turkish 
market. The second is aimed at 
supplying European countries. 
Right now, we are holding talks 
with a number of European 
countries to determine where 
the best place is to enter 
Europe. There are various 
proposals. Negotiations are 
under way with a whole range of 
European countries, including 
Greece and Bulgaria. But the 
corresponding developments 
could vary somewhat’.1 
A landfall in Bulgaria would seem to 
imply a resurrection of the aborted 
South Stream project, and would 
require the development of 
connections through Bulgaria and the 
Balkans to markets in central, 
northern and Western Europe. 
Moreover, Russia is clearly keeping its 
options open with regard to what kind 
of a route it might seek to develop to 
reach market hubs in Italy or Austria.  
As of late 2017, Gazprom had reached 
agreements concerning potential 
development of both a southern route 
to Italy via Greece – the so-called 
‘Greek Stream’ approach – and also a 
more northerly route – which might be 
termed ‘Son of South Stream’ – via 
Serbia and Hungary, aimed at either 
the monitoring station at Tarvisio in 
northeastern Italy or at the 
Baumgarten hub in Austria.  
                                                 
 
1 Talks under way on extending Turkish 
Stream to EU – Medvedev, Interfax, Natural 
Gas Daily Europe, May 23, 2017. 
However, the agreements concluded in 
connection with both options appear to 
be preliminary and are more akin to 
initial Memoranda of Understanding 
(MoUs) than to the the kind of Final 
Investment Decisions (FIDs) that 
Gazprom signed in the autumn of 2012 
with Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and 
Slovenia for the original South Stream 
project. 
In terms of actual pipeline 
construction, Russia appears to be 
keeping its options open. As of late 
November 2017 Gazprom was saying 
there was “a total of over 520 
kilometers of pipes laid along the two 
strings by now” and that TurkStream 
would be completed by end-2019.2 But 
that may not be quite the full story. 
Gazprom routinely refers to 
TurkStream as constituting two 
“strings” – with one intended to serve 
the Turkish market and the other to 
supply other customers in Europe. 
However, whether the vessel hired to 
lay TurkStream, the massive 
Pioneering Spirit, is laying both 
strings simultaneously is not so clear. 
The author understands that the vessel 
is indeed laying two physical pipelines 
simultaneously, but that each of these 
is just 32 inches in diameter, and thus 
would only be expected to have a 
routine capacity of around 8 bcm/y. 
With regard to pipelaying during the 
winter of 2017/18, it thus seems likely 




ovember/article382429/ for the 520-kms 
report and 
http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2017/n
ovember/article382429/ for the completion 
date.  
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that it was only the first 15.75 bcm/y 
string, the one intended to serve 
Turkey, that was being laid in the final 
months of 2017 and that while there 
may have been some initial laying of 
the inshore section of the second 
string, major offshore pipelaying has 
yet to start.  
This would be in line with the lack of 
absolute confirmation concerning the 
location of the second string’s landfall 
on the eastern coast of the Black Sea; 
in particular, whether it will copy the 
first string in landing at Kıyıköy in 
Turkey or whether, perhaps, it will 
diverge from the first string for about 
100 kilometers in order to make land 
near the Bulgarian port of Varna, the 
original landfall for South Stream.  
  
The ‘Greek Stream’ option 
Agreements concluded in connection 
with a potential ‘Greek Stream’ project 
include an MoU signed on 24 February 
2016 in Rome by the CEOs of Russia’s 
Gazprom, Italy’s (French-owned) 
Edison SpA, and Greece’s DEPA 
‘on natural gas deliveries across the 
Black Sea from Russia via third 
countries to Greece and from Greece 
to Italy in order to establish a southern 
route to deliver Russian natural gas 
to Europe’.3 On 2 June 2017, the CEOs 
of the same companies (though with a 
different head at DEPA) signed a 






further cooperation agreement 
specifying that the gas would come via 
Turkey.  
The ‘Greek Stream’ option effectively 
constitutes a revival of the 
Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy 
(ITGI) / Poseidon project, first 
envisaged more than a decade ago. 
This sought to ensure the development 
of a two-element system. The first 
would be a 613-km line across Greece 
from Komotini to Florovouni, just 
inland from the Ionian Sea. This would 
constitute the main Greek section of 
the original ITGI concept. The second 
would be the onward 210-km subsea 
connection from Florovouni to a 
landfall near Otranto in southern Italy, 
known as the Poseidon project.  
However, the prospects for such a 
system being built in time to serve 
Gazprom’s export interests remain 
remote. On 7 November, Elio Ruggieri, 
CEO of the IGI-Poseidon group, told 
the European Autumn Gas Conference 
in Milan that a final decision on 
constructing ITGI/Poseidon would be 
made in 2019 – and that the 
ITGI/Poseidon system could be built 
by 2023.4 Even this, however, appears 
to be a somewhat optimistic schedule. 





Poseidon company, which was founded in 
2008, takes its name from a project first 
contemplated at least six years earlier for the 
development of the Interconnector-Greece-
Italy (IGI) and the subsea component of such a 
system, Poseidon. Thus it is the IGI-Poseidon 
company that would like, over the next several 
years, to develop the full ITGI/Poseidon 
system.  
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In October 2017, Italy’s SNAM Group 
– which operates much of the Italian 
gas transport, storage and 
regasification facilities – published a 
consultation exercise aimed at testing 
the interest of shippers to use an 
ITGI/Poseidon system for gas transit 
between Greece and Italy. It concluded 
that costs to develop IGI/Poseidon 
would be reasonable, between €2.5 bn 
(around US$3 bn) for a 7.3 bcm 
capacity system and €4.0 bn (US$4.7 
bn) for a 13.7 bcm/y system, but 
cautioned that in either case “the 
duration of the activities to build the 
new capacity … will take approximately 
6 years after the positive outcome of 
the economic test” – with the outcome 
of the test not expected until the end of 
2019.5  
 
The ‘Son of South Stream’ option 
In November 2017, Interfax reported 
that Gazprom had asked its own 
NIIgazekonomika institute to perform 
a pre-investment study of scenarios in 
connection with the possible extension 
of TurkStream through the Balkans to 
the Baumgarten hub in Austria. 
Interfax cited Gazprom itself as the 
source for this report and appeared to 
be citing Gazprom directly as the 
source for a statement that the purpose 
of the study was “to choose the optimal 









configuration for projects to create 
new and expand existing gas 
transportation capacity in the 
territories of Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary 
and Austria necessary for the supply 
and transit of Russian gas to these 
countries.”6 
In June 2017, Hungarian Foreign 
Minister Peter Szijjarto had stated that 
‘Hungary, Russia and Serbia have 
resumed talks on the construction 
of the South Stream gas pipeline, 
but with a smaller capacity than it was 
initially discussed’.7 This would seem 
to indicate that what was being 
discussed was a pipeline of perhaps 10-
20 bcm/y capacity, in contrast to the 
32 bcm/y capacity system envisaged 
for the onshore South Stream project 
when supposed FIDs were being taken 
in late 2012. Even so, this would still 
be a very expensive project indeed. In 
2012, judging by contemporary 
accounts of the various individual 
country sections, the costs involved in 
laying some 1,200 kms on onshore 
pipeline from landfall at Varna in 
Bulgaria through Serbia, Hungary and 
Slovenia to Tarvisio in northeastern 
Italy, were estimated at around US$7.5 
bn.  
The costs for constructing an 
admittedly smaller ‘Son of South 
Stream’ line should be a little less than 
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this, but precision remains impossible 
at this stage for various reasons. The 
size of the pipe has not been disclosed, 
so pipe acquisition costs cannot be 
estimated. The terms under which 
Right of Way might be granted and 
landowners compensated are not 
known. Above all, it is not clear 
whether any such line would start in 
Bulgaria with one of the TurkStream 
strings diverted to a landfall in 
Bulgaria (a proposal naturally favored 
by the Bulgarian authorities), or in 
Turkey, at some onshore connection 
with TurkStream, or in Greece, where 
it might constitute an element in a 
broad regional project to create a 
corridor from the Aegean to Central 
Europe. 
 
Booking space in TAP 
The problem confronting both a route 
from Bulgaria and a revival of 
ITGI/Poseidon is the cost, particularly 
at a time of relatively low gas prices. 
On the other hand, if Gazprom were to 
bid for capacity in TAP, the only real 
issue it would face is whether anybody 
else would be able to compete with it.  
When the TAP group signed its 
Resolution To Construct, the 
equivalent of a Final Investment 
Decision, in November 2013, it was 
agreeing to develop a line in 
accordance with EU regulations that 
would ensure it had an exemption 
from third party access rules for the 
first 10 bcm/y of gas, but that any gas 
carried as part of the second stage 
expansion would be on the basis of 
competitive third party access. This 
means that any prospective supplier 
wishing to use TAP’s second stage 
capacity can ask for an open season 
and that, if a bidder is successful in 
booking space on commercial terms, 
the bidder has be accommodated. At 
the time, there was an implicit 
assumption that Azerbaijani gas would 
possess a sufficient competitive edge to 
ensure it would be the most likely 
source of gas for second stage 
transportation. 
This is no longer the case. Since the fall 
of international gas prices in 2014, the 
ability of Azerbaijan to secure the kind 
of upstream investment necessary to 
finance its planned ‘Next Wave’ of gas 
production has been strictly limited. 
Moreover, in practice, almost all 
competition from other producers can 
also be eliminated from the start: 
Turkmenistan because of its inability 
to conclude an agreement with 
Azerbaijan and cross-Caspian supply; 
Iran because of its disinclination to 
pursue gas exports and its 
determination to focus on oil; the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq because of 
the financial woes of the companies 
operating there; and the Eastern 
Mediterranean for a plethora of 
commercial and political reasons. In 
the long run, offshore Romania might 
prove a potential source of supply, but, 
unless there are some dramatic new 
discoveries in the next year or so, not 
in time to challenge Gazprom’s ability 
to make gas available for prospective 
insertion into TAP from as early as 
2020. 
The bottom line is that, under current 
conditions, Gazprom is by far the most 
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commercial prospective source of gas 
for any second stage TAP expansion. In 
addition, on grounds of cost, it would 
seem far more likely that Gazprom 
would opt to ship gas to Italy through 
an expanded TAP rather than by 
building a successor to South Stream.  
Officially, sources in both TAP and 
Gazprom have told the author as late 
as September 2017 that there has been 
no official or unofficial approach by 
either side concerning possible 
Gazprom input into TAP.8 But that this 
is indeed under consideration was 
made clear in January 2017, when 
Gazprom Deputy Chairman Alexander 
Medvedev, for the first time mentioned 
TAP: 
‘We have installed available 
capacity ready to produce more 
than 100 bcm of gas today, so 
we don’t need any additional 
investment to produce more 
than 100 bcm. But in order to 
bring this gas to Europe we 
need additional infrastructure 
which we are working on with 
our European partners – 
NordStream 2 and Turkish 
Stream. This capacity will not 
be sufficient to bring all this to 
Europe. So this is why we are 
talking to use available capacity 
on Poseidon project, (the 
                                                 
 
8 A report in Russia’s Kommersant newspaper 
on 5 June 2017 that SNAM CEO Marco Alvera 
had suggested during talks in St. Petersburg 
with Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller that the 
Russian giant should consider shipping 
TurkStream gas to Italy via TAP, in which 
SNAM is a 20% shareholder, was immediately 
denied by SNAM.  
studies for) which will be ready 
soon – or maybe TAP’.9  
Perhaps more importantly, on 19 
September 2017, Turkey’s Official 
Gazette announced that the Turkish 
cabinet had formally ratified an 
intergovernmental agreement with 
Greece allowing for the development of 
the ITGI/Poseidon natural gas transit 
system between Turkey, Greece and 
Italy.  
This was a somewhat peculiar 
development, since this constituted 
ratification of an agreement that was 
actually concluded more than a decade 
earlier and which had already led to its 
principal concrete conclusion, the 
opening of a direct gas pipeline 
between Karacabey in Turkey and 
Komotini in Greece, in 2007.  
As a result, initial Turkish and 
international reports on this long-
delayed ratification naturally focused 
on the ITGI/Poseidon element and saw 
the ratification as clearing the way for 
Russian gas to flow through Turkey to 
enter an ITGI/Poseidon system.10 
                                                 
 
9 Medvedev, comments at European Gas 
Conference in Vienna, 24 January 2017. 
According to the interpreter, and therefore as 
heard by most of the audience, Medvedev 
referred to ‘the Poseidon project, which will be 
ready soon’. He told the author immediately 
afterwards that he had said, in Russian, that it 
was the studies for the Poseidon project which 
would be ready soon. 
10 See Natural Gas World, 19 September 2017, 
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Moreover, since most of the elements 
of the ITGI/Poseidon system still have 
to be built, it was natural to conclude 
that this was an indication that Turkey 
was clearing the way for Russian gas to 
enter an ITGI/Poseidon system and, as 
a logical consequence, that it would be 
for Gazprom to finance or arrange 
financing so that the ITGI/Poseidon 
system could be developed. 
This is almost certainly a major 
misunderstanding of the situation.  
What the ratification does is that it 
clears the way for any connection from 
Turkey to Greece. In the current 
context this means it clears the way for 
the onshore section of TurkStream, 
which is already slated to end at the 
same Ipsala/Kipoi border crossing 
from Turkey to Greece as the SGC, to 
connect within Greece – in or around 
Kipoi – to the TAP section of the SGC 
rather than having first to connect 
within Turkey – in or around Ipsala – 
to the TANAP section of the SGC. In 
effect, it enables Gazprom to 
contemplate having to build only a few 
kms of connecting pipeline in Greece 
in order to access TAP.  
 
 
                                                                      
 
and Daily Sabah, Turkey, 19 September 2017, 
Agreement to bolster gas transfer between 








The challenge posed by TurkStream to 
the prospective expansion of the SGC 
remains key to any consideration of 
the medium- or long-term 
development of the SGC. Prospective 
Russian input into the SGC, by means 
of a request to use the expansion 
capacity of the TAP, can only be denied 
if the European Union changes its 
regulations regarding third party 
access, or some other producer is able 
to make a better offer for available 
capacity than that any offer that 
Gazprom might make.  
No matter how much political 
posturing there might be, it seems 
unimaginable that the European 
Commission would abandon its 
support for open access. This should 
therefore be ruled out. Unless there is 
a dramatic upsurge in both European 
demand for gas and of gas prices – a 
highly unlikely combination – it seems 
equally improbable that Gazprom 
would either be interested in funding 
the development of expensive new 
pipelines which would have to operate 
in accordance with EU regulations or 
that it would be able to find partners 
willing to make the necessary 
investments. 
But Gazprom will have gas available 
for input into an expanded TAP, and 
therefore as a guide to Gazprom’s 
likely course in this respect one should 
not look to Dmitri Medvedev’s 
comments concerning ‘talks with a 
number of European countries’ but to 
Alexander Medvedev’s tantalising hint 
that ‘maybe’ TAP offered a suitable 
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solution to the conundrum posed by 
TurkStream’s second string.  
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Rethinking Energy Policy in 
Central and Eastern Europe  








This paper provides an overview of an upcoming book which seeks to do just this by 
asking the questions, what role does Russia play in the Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) energy sector and how did the Russian-CEE energy relationship develop since 
the early 1990s? One of the central thesis outlined here argues that in order to fully 
understand Russian involvement in the regional CEE energy complex, the Russian-
CEE energy relationship should be analysed in the context of the political and 
economic transition that both Russia and the CEE states underwent following 1989. 
It is asserted that questions on which energy security analysis normally center—such 
as a country’s energy mix, its transport system, and energy vulnerabilities—have to 
be considered along with questions related to the post-communist transformation, 
interactions between emerging post-socialist elites in Russia and the CEE region, as 
well as general governance structures. 
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Introduction  
 
Central and East European (CEE) 
energy policy and security debates 
have in recent years been primarily 
viewed through a realist lens. This 
emphasises the geopolitics of energy, 
with focus placed on security of supply 
and the vulnerability of the CEE region 
stemming from its dependency on 
Russian energy imports (specifically 
natural gas) and Russia’s perceived 
willingness to use energy as a political 
tool to advance its foreign policy aims.1 
Such interpretations also extend 
beyond academic analysis and are 
often to be found in national policy. A 
cursory glance at any of the national 
security strategies from the region 
highlights how energy has become 
securitised as a policy matter. This was 
most clearly seen in the 2007 Polish 
National Security Strategy, published 
in the aftermath of the 2006 Russia-
Ukraine gas crisis and which noted 
how, ‘The Russian Federation, taking 
advantage of the rising energy prices, 
has been attempting intensively to 
reinforce its position on a 
superregional level’.2 ‘The dependence 
of the Polish economy on supplies of 
                                                 
 
1 See for example: Newman, R. (2011). ‘Oil, 
carrots, and sticks: Russia’s energy resources 
as a foreign policy tool’, Journal of Eurasian 
Studies, 2(2), pp.134-143. Slobodian, N. 
(2016). ‘Russia, Ukraine and European Energy 




security, accessed 19 August 2017. 
2 Polish Government (2007). National 
Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland. 
Warsaw. Page 6. 
energy resources – crude oil and 
natural gas – from one source is the 
greatest external threat to our 
security’ [author’s emphasis].3  
 
The legacy of such thinking has 
continued to inform understanding of 
and attitudes towards Russia’s role 
within the CEE region's energy 
landscape. Ongoing political conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine and the 
promotion of pipeline projects, such as 
Nord Stream 2, which reinforce 
perceptions of continued Russian 
dominance of the European energy 
supply market, do little to move the 
debate away from Russia. While a 
geopolitically driven analysis is not 
without merit, an overtly Kremlin-
centric analysis may overstate the 
strength of the leverage that Russia has 
had over these countries and 
potentially overlooks other nuances, 
including the national interests and 
power politics, at play within the CEE 
states. Therefore, while we should 
acknowledge that Russia is and will 
remain an important actor which 
cannot be dismissed, we must try to 
better understand the extent of its role.  
 
This paper provides an overview of an 
upcoming book4 which seeks to do just 
                                                 
 
3 Ibid. Page 8.  
4 The co-edited book by Ostrowski, W. and 
Butler, E. (eds) is entitled Understanding 
Energy Security in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Russia, Transition and National 
Interest and will be published by Routledge. It 
will be available from the spring of 2018. 
Contributors to the book include: Dimitar 
Bechev, Eamonn Butler, Giedrius Cesnakas, 
Terry Cox, Milos Damnjanovic, Roland 
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this by asking the questions, what role 
does Russia play in the CEE energy 
sector and how did the Russian-CEE 
energy relationship develop since the 
early 1990s? One of the central thesis 
in the book and outlined here argues 
that in order to fully understand 
Russian involvement in the regional 
CEE energy complex, the Russian-CEE 
energy relationship should be analysed 
in the context of the political and 
economic transition that both Russia 
and the CEE states underwent 
following 1989. It is asserted that 
questions on which energy security 
analysis normally center—such as a 
country’s energy mix, its transport 
system, and energy vulnerabilities—
have to be considered along with 
questions related to the post-
communist transformation, 
interactions between emerging post-
socialist elites in Russia and the CEE 




Why is this important? 
 
Rebalancing the energy actor debates 
to include specific reference to the role 
played by CEE governments and 
national actors (including national 
champions) since the collapse of 
communism offers potential new 
avenues of enquiry. The contemporary 
CEE energy landscape has evolved 
over more than 25 years and cannot be 
assumed to be simply a Soviet-era 
legacy quirk, which locked the 
                                                                      
 
Dannreuther, Rick Fawn, Catherine Locatelli, 
Anca-Elena Mihalache, Wojciech Ostrowski, 
and Sylvan Rossiaud.  
countries of the region into a Soviet 
and later Russian sphere of energy 
influence, where pipeline 
infrastructure, and to a lesser degree, 
nuclear technology, dictated the 
direction of energy policy.  
 
This is not to say that close political 
and economic connections between 
Moscow and the various CEE capitals 
did not exist. Certainly, for some of the 
newly independent states of the region, 
specifically the Baltic States and those 
Central European states with higher 
dependence on Russian gas imports, 
the ties that bound them to Moscow 
were more than just the physical 
infrastructure. However, from the 
beginning of the post-communist era, 
governments across the region also 
started to develop their own policy 
positions and inaugurate moves to 
shift themselves out of that sphere or 
at least to distinguish themselves 
within it. It is important to recognise 
that these moves were not necessarily 
due to any inherent fear of Russia and 
the potential for it to use energy as a 
political tool, but rather they reflected 
the broader political and economic 
sentiment of the time, which saw the 
CEE countries orientate themselves 
more towards the liberal market 
economy structures of western Europe. 
The ‘return to Europe’ mantra that 
swept across the region and which 
underpinned most of the early 
transition government policies 
enabling political, economic and social 
transformation, was an important 
driving force for change, in the energy 
sector. It was to Europe that the 
countries of CEE primarily looked 
when undertaking this process, 
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particularly with regard to 
liberalisation and privatisation. 
 
The privatisation processes that were 
established during the transition of the 
early to mid-1990s helped to set the 
scene for evolution of the CEE-Russian 
relationship to the current day. It is 
important to recognise that the 
transition did not occur in an 
institutional vacuum and that the 
paths followed by countries before the 
transition started matter a great deal 
for the final outcome. This point is 
particularly significant in the case of 
energy systems and its operations 
which are based on long-term projects, 
arrangements and links cannot be 
easily broken. However, many of the 
decisions taken at this time, at national 
level, dictated the extent to which 
Russia and its own newly established 
national energy corporations were able 
to benefit from privatisation processes 
in CEE. When we look at this in detail 
what we find is that the capability of 
Russia to gain traction in the region’s 
energy sector was actually quite 
limited, and it is only when expressly 
invited, as in the early stages of the 
privatisation process in the Baltic 
States or in the more recent case of 
Serbia, that it was able to consolidate 
and strengthen its involvement and 
influence.  
 
In the book that informs this paper, it 
is argued that instead of concentrating 
solely on the Kremlin and the 
geopolitics of post-Soviet Russia, we 
should pay much more attention to 
broader economic drivers. This is 
reinforced by other examples within 
the book which emphasises the 
political-economy of the privatisation 
era. This may help to explain why 
Russian companies—in particular, 
Lukoil—to a large degree failed to 
establish themselves in the CEE energy 
sector. At the same time, Rosneft, the 
number one Russian oil company, 
remained more or less absent from the 
CEE downstream market. For most of 
the CEE states, privatisation of the 
energy sector was intended to help 
establish strong, market orientated 
economies with efficient and effective 
national actors and opportunities for 
domestic and foreign investment via 
ownership of business and 
infrastructure commodities. It was 
believed that the new owners would 
transform the sector through injecting 
both operational business knowledge 
and the necessary financial capital to 
enable development.  There was also 
clear preference for western rather 
than Russian foreign investors, in part 
driven by the attractiveness of western 
capital and business best practice 
knowledge.  There was also the fact 
that for some states the sell-off of the 
energy sector offered quick and easy 
access to financial capital needed to 
help pay off Soviet-era debts, including 
those held by western states. Finally, 
the preference for western investors 
was also heavily influenced by the 
belief that opening up their energy 
sector, alongside other strategic 
sectors—such as telecommunications 
and transport—would benefit the CEE 
states by reinforcing the ‘return to 
Europe’ ideal and that it would 
represent a first major step for their 
longer-term European integration.  
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Russia’s greatest success reflects its 
continued role as an energy supplier, 
and it is in this context that 
partnership has often proven most 
fruitful—despite growing concerns and 
vocalisations about dependency. It is 
economic or rather, commercial, 
rationales that have traditionally 
dictated the willingness of CEE states 
to purchase Russian energy. Russia is a 
very attractive supplier of gas to the 
CEE region due to the proximity of 
these markets and the relatively low 
production and transport costs. 
Despite everything that has been said 
regarding diversification of energy 
supply for the CEE region, the simple 
reality is that Russian gas is extremely 
competitive for a number of countries.  
It is only in the Baltic States—
specifically Lithuania and to a lesser 
degree Latvia—where we see recent 
geopolitical attitudes towards Russia 
override longer standing commercial 
considerations.  For most of the other 
states, specifically those with a higher 
percentage use of natural gas within 
their overall energy mix, such as 
Hungary, commercial benefit and 
value for money continue to directly 
inform decisions to buy energy, 
specifically natural gas, from Russia. 
This is all the more relevant in light of 
a wider failure to invest in meaningful, 
alternative pipeline infrastructure to 
support new, cost effective supply 
routes.     
 
When we look in closer detail at the 
specifics of Russian gas in the CEE 
region we see that the region has a 
varied landscape. Overall, gas plays a 
much smaller role in the CEE regional 
energy mix than has often been 
assumed within general discourse. An 
examination of the gas market 
highlights differences in attitude 
towards Russia, the openness of CEE 
to engage with Russia and the extent to 
which Russia has been able to access 
the sector across the various countries 
of the region. The book that informs 
this paper shows how in the case of 
Romania, political elites, supported by 
the local population, firmly rejected 
any involvement of Russian companies 
in the country’s energy sector both 
prior to and after the collapse of the 
communist regime. Other CEE 
countries, began devising projects 
aimed at diversification from solely 
purchasing Russian gas, in some cases 
as early as in the 1990s. The Czech 
Republic was most successful at 
adopting this strategy while others 
followed its footsteps in the 2000s 
with the help of the European Union.  
 
In the case of Bulgaria, Poland, and 
more recently, Hungary, the corrupted 
nature of the transition led to the 
creation of environment for the 
involvement of Russian energy actors 
who in tandem with local political 
elites established rent-seeking, 
intermediary companies. The presence 
of those companies is often viewed as 
part of the Kremlin’s strategy aimed at 
dominating the CEE energy complex, 
but there is a lack of evidence to show 
that this was generally the case.  
 
In the case of the Baltic Republics and 
Serbia, the Russian energy companies 
managed to penetrate the energy 
system to a much greater extent than 
in other states in the CEE regions, 
albeit, for very different reasons. The 
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Baltic Republics due to their historic 
Soviet ties and relative isolation from 
the European energy system did not 
have much choice but to actively 
engage with Russian companies. 
Serbia, which until the mid-2000s, 
followed similar trajectories to Poland 
or Bulgaria, began collaborating with 
Russian companies in a more intensive 
manner only after the Russian state 
actively supported Serbian efforts 
aimed at blocking Kosovo’s 
independence. 
 
This suggests that there are 3 main 
blocs of states in the CEE region 
reflecting differing attitudes to Russian 
energy relations and some states have 
moved fluidly across or between these 
blocs in recent years. The first bloc is 
represented by the resistors and 
includes Romania, the Czech Republic, 
and more recently the three Baltic 
states. These countries have actively 
resisted and opposed where possible 
Russian influence. The second bloc is 
represented by what we term the 
hesitant partners and this includes 
Poland, Hungary and to a lesser extent 
Bulgaria. These states recognise the 
need to work with and partner Russia 
in terms of energy supply, but are wary 
of completely opening up access to 
their energy sector and will actively 
oppose Russian investment when not 
deemed to be in their national interest, 
but will be more willing to explore 
partnership opportunities. The third 
bloc is the collaborator and this 
includes Serbia, but we also find 
increasing evidence of Hungarian and 
Bulgarian movement towards this bloc 
in recent times. The collaborators have 
essentially opened their energy sector 
to Russian influence and complete 
penetration. The following section 
outlines three examples, one from each 
of the blocs to show how the legacies of 
their communist past and the 
transition era have informed their 
attitude towards Russia.  
 
 
Bloc One: ‘The Resistor’ 
 
The key to understanding the 
dynamics governing the Russian-
Romanian energy relationship is the 
legacy of Ceausescu’s policies, which 
aimed at gaining economic and 
political independence from Moscow 
during the Communist era. In the post-
1991 period the old Communist policy 
was continued in the actions of 
Romanian elites who blocked not only 
Russian but also Western capital from 
entering the country, including to the 
energy sector, with the Romanian 
public largely supportive of the policy. 
Thus, the state remained a dominant 
actor in the energy sector, while local 
elites captured key areas of the sector 
and engaged in rent-seeking activities. 
The limited Russian investments that 
did get through, were not driven by 
any political agenda, they were rather 
aimed at making a quick profit, 
predominantly via asset stripping. 
There is also no proof that Russian 
businesses held privileged relations 
with political parties or decision 
makers. Ironically, the outcome of this 
is that the various protectionist 
measures, which initially shielded the 
country from Russian penetration, 
have led to a clash with liberally 
oriented EU institutions and Romania 
may yet find itself forced to be more 
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open to Russian investment and 
engagement within its energy sector.  
 
 
Bloc Two: ‘The Hesitant Partner’ 
 
In the case of Poland, energy security 
was never threatened directly by 
Russia because the state retained 
primary control over the energy sector 
and because coal plays a key part in the 
country’s energy mix, reducing the 
need for extensive natural gas imports. 
When we consider domestic politics, 
including that emanating from the 
transition era it is possible to shine a 
spotlight on the corrupted 
environment of the 1990s and early 
2000s, which allowed Polish and 
Russian political, commercial and 
private actors to engage in rent seeking 
activities. The collusion between the 
two sets of actors had a detrimental 
effect on the way in which the debate 
concerning Polish energy security has 
developed and on the broader political 
and economic relationship between 
Russia and Poland. Interestingly, it is 
possible to see how the division and 
infighting between the ‘anti-Russian’ 
post-solidarity camp and the ‘pro-
Russian’ post-communist camp, 
coupled with corruption scandals that 
brought to the murky dealings between 
the Russian oil and gas sectors and 
Polish political actors, have kept 
generating interest about the country’s 
energy security and further fueled 
concerns about Russia’s real 
intentions. The Ukrainian-Russian ‘gas 
wars’ in the mid-2000s entrenched a 
negative view of the Russian oil and 
gas sectors and gave the energy 
security debate a truly geopolitical 
dimension, which has shifted the 
country more towards the resistor end 
of the hesitant partner spectrum. Since 
the late 2000s the EU, similarly to 
other countries in the CEE region, has 
played an important dual role in the 
Polish-Russian relationship, 
facilitating reconciliation between two 
parties, whilst also aiding Polish 
efforts aimed at diversifying away from 
Russian oil and gas supplies. 
 
 
Bloc Three: ‘The Collaborator’ 
 
Since the late 2000s, Serbia has 
increased its energy insecurity by 
essentially ‘handing over’ its oil and 
gas sector to Gazprom. This move was 
due to special political circumstances 
which were not replicated in other 
countries. Having said that, until the 
late 2000s, the story of the Serbian-
Russian energy relationship, despite 
Serbia’s international isolation in the 
1990s, was not that different to other 
countries in the region. The post-
communist evolution of the Serbian 
energy sector was accompanied by the 
presence of Russian intermediary 
companies, involved in the sale of 
natural gas, and an increase in the 
prevalence of corruption scandals in 
the energy sector. As with other states 
in the region, the energy sector also 
largely remained in the hands of the 
state. Yet, the relationship between the 
Serbian and Russian energy 
relationship moved to a different level 
after 2007. Moscow’s attempts within 
the United Nations (UN) and other 
international organisations to block 
recognition of Kosovo’s independence 
changed the political dynamics 
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between the countries. The provision 
of this vital support from the Serbian 
perspective coincided with an 
intensification of the energy 
relationship between Russia and 
Serbia which led to the 2008 deal with 
Gazprom. As a result of the agreement, 
the Russian company now controls 
Serbia’s oil and gas extraction, as well 
its oil refining capacities and much of 
its oil retail sector. In addition, the 
Serbian energy sector depends on a 
single pipeline through which Russian 
gas is piped. Consequently, towards 
the end of the 2010s, Serbia which 
traditionally enjoyed a high degree of 
energy security—with coal accounting 
for over half of its energy mix—found 
itself exposed to pressures from Russia 
which now possessed very strong 
leverage. In short, Serbia has trodden a 
diametrically opposite path from the 






This paper, nor the book that it is 
drawn from, assumes to explain every 
aspect of CEE energy relations. It does, 
however, acknowledge that we cannot 
view the region as a single unit of 
analysis and that explanations for the 
CEE countries’ diverging approaches 
to the issue of energy policy and 
security in relation to Russia have, on 
the whole, to date, followed a well-
established narrative developed by a 
range of scholars who divide the region 
into groups of actors representing anti-
Russian, pro-Russian and neutral 
bases.  We take the line that these 
explanations view energy security 
predominately through a realist lens 
with energy used as a geopolitical tool 
for the Russian state. This means that 
the economic and political 
complexities of the individual 
countries remain largely understudied 
in wider literature and that without 
engaging with these issues we cannot 
possible come to a fuller 
understanding of the region’s energy 
security including its relations with 
Russia and the European Union.  
 
The book’s contributors have sought to 
provide nuanced studies of a range of 
country cases, three Baltic states 
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), three 
central European states (Poland, 
Hungary and Czech Republic) and 
three south-east European states 
(Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia). These 
studies were tasked with moving 
beyond a simple realist type of 
analysis. This proved challenging 
because realism does have a role to 
play in understanding the national 
interest-led choices made by states. 
However, the book’s authors do show, 
through their analysis of different 
governance structures within the CEE 
energy sector, how conducive 
environments for Russian presence 
and influence emerged or were 
resisted. Discussion of the post-
communist transition, the emergence 
of post-socialist elite, politics of private 
and state-owned energy companies in 
the CEE states and the move to 
respond to the liberalisation agenda of 
the EU was scrutinised. This provides 
a better understanding of the dynamics 
governing approaches to energy 
security and policy in the CEE region.  
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It also allows us to open discussion on 
new emerging areas of interest. For 
example, not all future engagement on 
the energy front will be with Russia. 
Increasingly, Brussels is holding the 
CEE states accountable for failing to 
implement EU law appropriately. This 
potentially will bring Brussels and CEE 
states into possible conflict, albeit not 
the same type of conflict often 
assumed to exist with Moscow. As EU 
member states, the CEE countries are 
able to inform EU energy policy, but if 
common policy is to work effectively 
then all participants need to follow the 
rules. If these do not benefit the 
national interest of the CEE state, then 
we can expect attempts to push the 
acceptable boundaries of non-
compliance. Only by fully accepting 
that CEE states have agency and that 
their decisions will be grounded in not 
only current affairs but often past 
affairs will we be able to navigate and 
understand the politics underpinning 
Central and Eastern European energy 
policy and approaches to security. 
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